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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In 1992, the United States Supreme Court seemingly resolved the 
contentious issue of whether a target corporation could currently de-
duct the investment banking fees and costs it incurred when a 
friendly buyer acquired it. In INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,1 the 
Court clearly held that target corporations cannot deduct current in-
vestment banking fees and costs when they obtain only future bene-
fits in a merger.2 After INDOPCO, taxpayers began to worry that the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would require them to capitalize oth-
erwise currently deductible business expenses simply because those 
expenses yielded some future benefit.3 
 Although the IRS initially confirmed taxpayers’ fears when it be-
gan to extend INDOPCO’s holding, courts responded by limiting 
                                                                                                                    
 * J.D., with High Honors, Florida State University College of Law, 2001; B.B.A., 
Florida International University, 1998. 
 1. 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
 2. Id. at 88. The Court held that the target corporation, National Starch, could not 
currently deduct investment banking fees and costs because it obtained future benefits 
from its merger with Unilever. Id. See also W. Curtis Elliot Jr., Capitalization of Operating 
Expenses After INDOPCO: IRS Strikes Again, 5 S.C. LAW. 29, 30 (1993). 
 3. Lee A. Sheppard, The INDOPCO Case and Hostile Defense Expenses, 54 TAX 
NOTES 1458, 1459 (1992) (“Read broadly, Indopco means that the taxpayer always loses; 
that many expenditures not encompassed by section 263 must be capitalized because they 
produce a future benefit.”). 
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INDOPCO considerably. Initially, the IRS used INDOPCO’s “deduc-
tions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization”4 language in con-
junction with the separate and distinct asset test5 to aggressively 
deny deductions for expenses that taxpayers had otherwise currently 
deducted. Recently, however, the Third Circuit, in PNC Bancorp, Inc. 
v. Commissioner,6 applied a stricter version of the separate and dis-
tinct asset test.7 Similarly, when the IRS began denying taxpayers’ 
current deductions for expenses because those expenses created some 
type of future benefit, the Eighth Circuit, in Wells Fargo & Co. v. 
Commissioner,8 responded by applying a stricter version of the future 
benefit test than the Supreme Court applied in INDOPCO.9 Finally, 
when the IRS refused to distinguish between hostile and friendly 
takeovers, the Seventh Circuit, in A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. 
Commissioner,10 ruled that it must.11 
 However, because INDOPCO remains good law and many circuit 
courts have yet to address the numerous issues that it raises, tax-
payers need additional protection from INDOPCO. Therefore, Con-
gress should direct the Treasury to enact regulations that codify the 
Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit holdings to prevent the IRS from 
asserting its aggressive post-INDOPCO positions in other circuits. 
 Accordingly, this Comment posits that even though some courts 
have eased taxpayer concern by limiting INDOPCO to its facts, tax-
payers need greater reassurance that other courts will not revive 
INDOPCO. Part II addresses the differences between current deduc-
tions and capital expenses. Part III discusses the law before 
INDOPCO, as well as the Supreme Court’s INDOPCO opinion. Part 
IV recounts the IRS’s aggressive positions after INDOPCO. Part V 
argues that these positions promote poor policy because they lack ra-
tionale, violate the matching principle, and ignore the important dis-
tinction between friendly and hostile transactions. Part VI describes 
how courts have contained the IRS’s positions and limited INDOPCO 
to its facts. Finally, Part VII proposes treasury regulations that cod-
                                                                                                                    
 4. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. 
 5. Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971) (espousing the 
separate and distinct asset test, which instructed taxpayers to capitalize an expense that 
creates or increases the value of a separate and distinct asset). 
 6. 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 7. The court found that to be capitalizable, the expense must create a separate and 
distinct asset and not merely be associated with separate and distinct asset creation. Id. at 
830. 
 8. 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 9. The Wells Fargo court found that to be capitalizable, the expense must be not only 
related to a transaction that produces a future benefit, but also directly related to that 
transaction. Id. at 886. 
 10. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 11. Id. at 489.  
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ify the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuit holdings to ensure that 
other courts do not restore INDOPCO. 
II.   THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CURRENT DEDUCTION AND CAPITAL 
EXPENSE 
 When a taxpayer incurs an expense, that taxpayer may treat it in 
one of three ways: (1) as a current deduction; (2) as a depreciable or 
amortizable capital expenditure; or (3) as a nondepreciable or 
nonamortizable capital expenditure. Each alternative has different 
tax consequences for the taxpayer. When a taxpayer treats an ex-
pense as a current deduction, that taxpayer may deduct the expense 
from his or her taxable income.12 When a taxpayer treats an expense 
as a depreciable or amortizable capital expenditure, he or she takes 
the expense and spreads it over the useful life of the asset to which it 
relates.13 When a taxpayer treats an expense as a nondepreciable or 
nonamortizable capital expenditure, a taxpayer takes the expense 
and adds it to the basis14 of the asset to which the expense relates.15 
When a taxpayer sells the asset, he or she will recognize a gain on 
the amount realized minus the basis.16 Essentially, the taxpayer gets 
to deduct the expense when he or she sells the asset because the ex-
pense reduces part of the amount realized.17  
 The Internal Revenue Code (the Code) contains two main sections 
that helps the taxpayer determine which of the three treatments ap-
ply to a particular expense. The first section, § 162(a), states that 
“[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on 
any trade or business.”18 However, a second section of the Code, § 
263(a), limits § 162(a). Section 263(a) states: 
No deduction shall be allowed for—(1) [a]ny amount paid out for 
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments 
made to increase the value of any property or estate . . . [or] (2) 
[a]ny amount expended in restoring property or in making good 
the exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been 
made.19 
                                                                                                                    
 12. I.R.C. § 161 (1994); Id. § 162(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 13. Id. §§ 167, 168 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 14. An asset’s basis is generally its cost. Id. § 1012 (1994). 
 15. Id. § 1016(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 16. Id. § 1001(a) (1994). 
 17. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(b) (1960). 
 18. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 19. Id. § 263(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
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Section 263(a) trumps § 162(a).20 Therefore, a taxpayer may still have 
to treat an expense that falls under § 162(a) as a capital expense if 
the expense also falls under § 263(a).21 
 To receive a current deduction, taxpayers strive to fall under § 
162(a) and stay outside of § 263(a). Taxpayers favor current deduc-
tions because they allow taxpayers to reduce their taxable income 
currently rather than over time.22 The IRS, however, wants taxpay-
ers to fall within § 263(a), which delays deductions and maximizes 
the IRS’s current revenues.23 
 If a taxpayer must treat an expense as a capital expenditure, 
however, he or she prefers to treat it as a depreciable or amortizable 
capital expenditure, rather than a nondepreciable or nonamortizable 
capital expenditure. When an expense is depreciable or amortizable, 
the taxpayer may take the expense and spread it over the life of the 
asset it relates to.24 Therefore, instead of taking the entire expense 
and deducting it from taxable income in the first year, the taxpayer 
may take a portion of the expense and deduct it from taxable income 
every year over the related asset’s life.25 To do so, however, the tax-
payer must know the life of the asset involved or determine the life 
based on industry standards.26 When an asset’s useful life is 
undeterminable, the expenses related to that asset are 
nondepreciable or nonamortizable capital expenditures.27 In that 
case, the taxpayer cannot reduce his or her taxable income by any 
portion of the expense. Instead, the taxpayer must add the expense 
to his or her basis in the related asset.28 When the taxpayer 
eventually sells the asset, he or she may deduct this cost from the 
sale price to arrive at his or her taxable gain.29 
 Taxpayers prefer current deductions over depreciable or amortiz-
able capital expenditures due to the value of money doctrine.30 The 
time value of money doctrine states that a taxpayer would rather pay 
taxes later than sooner because a dollar today has greater value than 
                                                                                                                    
 20. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Melissa D. Ingalls, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Determining the Taxable Na-
ture of a Target Corporation’s Takeover Expenses, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1994). 
 23. Id. 
 24. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 25. When the related asset is a tangible asset (i.e., a building), this process is called 
depreciation. Id. § 167. When the related asset is an intangible asset, this process is called 
amortization. Id. § 197 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 26. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (as amended 1972). 
 27. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-1 (as amended 1994). 
 28. I.R.C. § 1016(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 29. Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(b) (1960). 
 30. See Ingalls, supra note 22, at 1170. 
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a dollar in the future.31 Therefore, a taxpayer would rather reduce his 
or her taxable income in year one rather than little by little in subse-
quent years. By the same token, a taxpayer would rather reduce his 
or her taxable income little by little in subsequent years than reduce 
his or her taxable income at the end of some unknown period of 
time.32 
 To summarize, due to the time value of money, a taxpayer’s ex-
pense categorization preferences rank in the following order: (1) cur-
rent deductions; (2) depreciable or amortizable capital expenditures; 
and (3) nondepreciable or nonamortizable capital expenditures.33 
INDOPCO creates a problem by giving the IRS the potential to con-
vert certain expenses from current deductions into nondepreciable or 
nonamortizable capital expenditures, thereby giving taxpayers a 
large economic jolt.34 
III.   INDOPCO’S FAMILY TREE 
 In Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass’n,35 the U.S. Su-
preme Court characterized an expense as a capital expense because 
it created a “separate and distinct additional asset.”36 The taxpayer, 
Lincoln Savings and Loan Association, paid two premiums to the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation.37 The first pre-
mium funded the primary reserve, which included a general insur-
ance fund for all participants.38 The “additional premium” funded the 
secondary reserve, of which Lincoln Savings held a pro rata share.39 
The issue in Lincoln Savings involved whether Lincoln Savings could 
deduct the additional premium that it paid to the Federal Savings 
                                                                                                                    
 31. For example, if a taxpayer has a $100 tax liability payable either this year or next 
year (assuming no penalty), he would rather pay it next year because if he invests $90.91 
today at a 10 percent rate of return he will have $100 next year. Thus, by getting to pay his 
tax liability next year, he reduces his tax bill by $9.09. 
 32. Id. However, taxpayers must balance their expected time value of money savings 
with the possibility that tax rates may increase. If tax rates increase, a taxpayer would 
rather defer his or her deduction to offset income in later years where tax rates are higher. 
On the other hand, if tax rates decrease, a taxpayer would prefer taking his or her deduc-
tion sooner because the current tax rate is higher than the future tax rate. 
 33.  David J. Roberts, Capitalizing the Target’s Transaction Costs in Hostile Take-
overs, 73 WASH. L. REV. 489, 492 (1998) (“Because of both the time value of money and the 
fact that an immediate deduction can reduce taxable income for the current tax year, tax-
payers generally consider immediate deductions more valuable than deductions taken 
gradually over a number of years.”). 
 34. The INDOPCO Court realized this problem but provided no solution. See 
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992) (“[W]here no specific asset or useful life 
can be ascertained, [the cost] is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise.”). 
 35. 403 U.S. 345 (1971). 
 36. Id. at 354. 
 37. Id. at 348. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 349-50. 
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and Loan Insurance Corporation as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense under section 162(a).40 In holding that it could not, the 
Court stated: 
[T]he presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future 
aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible 
have prospective effect beyond the taxable year. 
 What is important and controlling, we feel, is that the . . . pay-
ment serves to create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a 
separate and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable 
consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not an expense, 
let alone an ordinary expense, deductible under § 162(a) . . . .41 
 According to the Eighth Circuit, “[n]o less than five of the Federal 
Circuit Courts of Appeal[s] erroneously interpreted [the language 
above] to mean that the Supreme Court had adopted a new test for 
determining whether an expenditure was currently deductible or 
must be capitalized.”42 
Each of these Circuits, in response to the Lincoln Savings decision, 
adopted a new “separate and distinct additional asset” test, or 
some variation thereof. The new test permitted necessary business 
expenditures to be fully deducted during the taxable year unless 
the expenditure created or enhanced a separate and distinct addi-
tional asset.43 
This mischaracterization lasted until the INDOPCO decision, which 
disavowed the separate and distinct asset test as the exclusive test 
for distinguishing between deductible expenses and capital expendi-
tures.44 
 INDOPCO addressed whether a target corporation may currently 
deduct certain professional expenses incurred during a friendly take-
over.45 The target, INDOPCO, Inc., formerly named National Starch 
and Chemical Corporation, was an adhesives, starches, and specialty 
chemical products supplier.46 The acquirer, Unilever, was one of Na-
tional Starch’s customers and wanted to buy it in a friendly transac-
tion.47 During the takeover negotiations, National Starch used Mor-
gan Stanley “to evaluate its shares, to render a fairness opinion, and 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Id. at 345-46. 
 41. Id. at 354. 
 42. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874, 881 (8th Cir. 2000). See also Central 
Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984); NCNB Corp. v. 
United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); First Sec. Bank of Idaho v. Comm’r, 592 F.2d 
1050 (9th Cir. 1979); Colo. Springs Nat’l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 
1974); Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Comm’r, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 43. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 881. 
 44. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1992). 
 45. Id. at 80. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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generally to assist [it] in the emergence of a hostile tender offer.”48 
Shortly after Morgan Stanley found the $73.50 per share final offer 
to be fair, the parties consummated the transaction.49 
 Morgan Stanley charged National Starch a fee of more than $2.2 
million, as well as $7,586 for out-of-pocket expenses and $18,000 for 
legal fees.50 The Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates law firm 
charged National Starch $490,000 in legal fees and $15,069 in out-of-
pocket expenses.51 National Starch itself incurred $150,962 in miscel-
laneous expenses such as accounting, printing, proxy solicitation, 
and SEC fees.52 On its federal income tax return, National Starch de-
ducted the fees it paid Morgan Stanley, but did not deduct the fees 
and expenses it paid the Debevoise law firm or the other miscellane-
ous expenses it incurred.53 The IRS disallowed National Starch’s de-
duction for Morgan Stanley’s fee.54  
 National Starch sought a redetermination from the U.S. Tax 
Court and asserted its right to deduct its banking fees and expenses, 
as well as its legal and miscellaneous expenses.55 The Tax Court, 
agreeing with the IRS, ruled that all of the expenses were capital ex-
penses and therefore not deductible under § 162(a).56 The court based 
its holding primarily on the merger’s long-term benefits to National 
Starch.57 On appeal to the Third Circuit, National Starch contended 
that the disputed expenses were currently deductible because they 
did not create or enhance a separate and distinct additional asset.58 
But the Third Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the tax 
court, agreeing that Unilever’s enormous resources and the transac-
tion’s synergy prospects served National Starch’s long-term better-
ment.59 
 The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected National Starch’s argument 
that Lincoln Savings’ separate and distinct asset test represented 
the exclusive test for distinguishing between currently deductible ex-
penses and capital expenses.60 Moreover, the Court made it a point to 
state that “deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization.”61 
                                                                                                                    
 48. Id. at 81. 
 49. Id. at 81-82. 
 50. Id. at 82. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Nat’l Starch & Chem. Co. v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 67, 73 (1989). 
 56. Id. at 75. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Nat’l Starch & Chem. Co. v. Comm’r, 918 F.2d 428-31 (1990). 
 59. Id. at 432-33. 
 60. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1992). 
 61. Id. at 84. 
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 Furthermore, the Court clarified that Lincoln Savings did not re-
ject the future benefit test as a means of distinguishing an ordinary 
business expense from a capital expenditure.62 The Court held that 
although the mere presence of an incidental future benefit cannot 
warrant capitalization, “a taxpayer’s realization of benefits beyond 
the year in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably impor-
tant in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is imme-
diate deduction or capitalization.”63 
 Applying the newly revived future benefit test to INDOPCO’s 
facts, the Court determined that the benefits National Starch ob-
tained included: (1) synergy, which the Court called “resource-related 
benefits”; (2) the transformation from a publicly held to wholly owned 
subsidiary, which included the advantage of swapping 3,500 share-
holders for one and thus eliminating expenses related to reporting 
and disclosure obligations, proxy battles, and derivative suits; and (3) 
the administrative convenience and simplicity of eliminating previ-
ously authorized but unissued shares of preferred stock and reducing 
the total number of authorized shares of common stock from eight 
million to one thousand.64 
IV.   THE IRS’S AGGRESSIVE POST-INDOPCO POSITIONS 
 The IRS viewed the Supreme Court’s ruling in INDOPCO as “a 
green light to seek capitalization of costs that had previously been 
considered deductible in a number of businesses and industries.”65 
After INDOPCO, the IRS could use the Supreme Court’s holding that 
“deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization”66 when ap-
plying Lincoln Savings’s separate and distinct asset test67 to aggres-
sively deny deductions for expenses that the IRS had previously al-
lowed taxpayers to currently deduct. INDOPCO also favored the IRS 
by lifting the “separate and distinct asset barrier” that five circuits 
had placed on the IRS.68 INDOPCO also allowed the IRS to deny cur-
rent deductions in cases where the expense created some type of fu-
ture benefit for the taxpayer even though it did not create a separate 
and distinct asset. Finally, because the Supreme Court in INDOPCO 
did not limit its holding to friendly acquisitions, the IRS could freely 
deny current deductions for expenses related to both friendly and 
hostile acquisitions. This section explores how the IRS took advan-
tage of all that INDOPCO offered. 
                                                                                                                    
 62. Id. at 87. 
 63. Id. at 87. This language revived the future benefit test. 
 64. Id. at 88-89. 
 65. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 66. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. 
 67. Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971).  
 68. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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A.   The IRS’s Position in PNC Bancorp 
 After INDOPCO, the IRS used Lincoln Savings’s separate and 
distinct asset test and INDOPCO’s “deductions are exceptions to the 
norm of capitalization” language to deny current deductions for costs 
it had always allowed taxpayers to currently deduct. For example, in 
PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Commissioner,69 the Commissioner took the po-
sition that the taxpayer had to capitalize marketing, researching, 
and loan originating expenses over certain loans’ lives.70 
 PNC Bancorp addressed whether a bank could currently deduct 
the following: (1) payments that the bank made to third parties for 
activities that helped it determine whether to approve a loan (i.e., 
credit screening, property reports, and appraisals); (2) the security 
interest recording costs associated with secured loans; and (3) the in-
ternal costs associated with loan marketing, loan origination, and 
completing and reviewing loan applications.71 
 In the late 1980s, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB)72 promulgated Statement of Financial Standards 91 (SFAS 
91), which required banks to separate these types of costs and recog-
nize them over a loan’s life for financial accounting and reporting 
purposes.73 Although First National Pennsylvania Corporation 
(FNPC) and United Federal Bancorp, Inc., (UFB)74 complied with 
SFAS 91, both banks continued to currently deduct those costs for 
tax purposes.75 Contrary to its earlier practices, the IRS disallowed 
these deductions.76 Apparently, the IRS viewed INDOPCO’s “deduc-
tions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization” language as a 
“green light” to piggyback onto SFAS 91 and deny deductions for ex-
penses that taxpayers had previously been able to currently deduct. 
B.   The IRS’s Position in Wells Fargo 
 The IRS also exploited INDOPCO’s future benefit test to deny 
current deductions for all costs associated with merger activity, in-
                                                                                                                    
 69. 212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 70. Id. at 824. “Emboldened by a U.S. Supreme Court case, and a change in private 
sector financial accounting standards, the IRS aggressively attempted to squash the de-
ductibility of bank loan costs, casting them out from under the ‘ordinary and necessary’ 
business expense Code designation, into a quagmire of capitalization.” Mary Ann Fenicato, 
PNC Prevails Over IRS: Loan Expense Deductibility Upheld, 2 No. 19 LAW. J. 3, 13 (2000). 
 71. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 826. 
 72. Id. The FASB is “an independent private sector organization that establishes 
standards for financial accounting and reporting.” Id. at 825 n.1.  
 73. Id. at 825. 
 74. Id. PNC was a bank holding company and the petitioner in the case. FNPC and 
UFB merged into PNC in 1992 and 1994, respectively, and PNC succeeded to both compa-
nies’ liabilities. Id. 
 75. Id. at 826. 
 76. Id. at 827. 
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cluding all “in house” costs. For example, in Wells Fargo & Co. v. 
Commissioner,77 the IRS tried to deny a deduction for the portion of 
the target’s officers’ salaries attributable to their work on a friendly 
acquisition, even though the target did not hire any of them specifi-
cally for that task.78 
 Wells Fargo concerned a bank merger between Davenport, an 
Iowa state bank, and Norwest, a bank holding company and owner of 
Bettendorf Bank.79 Davenport’s management became concerned that 
banks of its size would be unable to compete when Iowa adopted in-
terstate banking legislation that allowed banking institutions located 
in states next to Iowa to acquire Iowa banks.80 In July 1991, Daven-
port’s board met to consider a transaction in which Davenport and 
Bettendorf would merge to form New Davenport, a national bank 
that Norwest would wholly own.81 The parties consummated the deal 
in January 1992.82 
 Prior to July 1991, Davenport spent $83,450 in investigating 
Norwest’s and Bettendorf’s products, services, and reputation to as-
certain whether Norwest and Bettendorf would be a good business fit 
for Davenport and whether the proposed transaction would benefit 
the Davenport community.83 Davenport spent another $27,820 in fees 
related to the investment bankers’ services, which included “negoti-
ating price, working on the fairness opinion, advising [Davenport]’s 
board with respect to fiduciary duties, [and] satisfying securities law 
requirements.”84 
 During 1991, some of Davenport’s officers worked on various as-
pects of the transaction.85 Davenport, however, did not hire any of 
them specifically for that task.86 Instead, it hired them to conduct 
Davenport’s day-to-day banking business.87 Moreover, Davenport’s 
participation in the transaction had no effect on the officers’ sala-
ries.88 “Of the salaries paid to the officers in 1991, $150,000 was at-
tributable to services performed in the transaction.”89 But when Dav-
enport deducted the salaries, including the $150,000 deduction at-
tributable to the transaction, the Commissioner disallowed the de-
                                                                                                                    
 77. 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 78. Id. at 880. 
 79. Id. at 876-77. 
 80. Id. at 877. 
 81. Id. at 874. 
 82. Id. at 879. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 879-80. 
 86. Id. at 880. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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duction.90 The IRS took the position that because the salaries were 
attributable to a merger transaction that yielded future benefits, the 
taxpayer needed to capitalize them.91 Previously, taxpayers could 
currently deduct salaries as ordinary and necessary business ex-
penses. But as it did in PNC Bancorp, the IRS in Wells Fargo aggres-
sively tried to stop those current deductions. 
C.   The IRS’s Position in Hostile Takeovers 
 Finally, the IRS exploited the fact that the INDOPCO court failed 
to limit its holding to friendly acquisitions by denying deductions for 
hostile acquisition defense costs, despite the fact that these costs 
yield no future benefit.92 For example, in one case, a target expended 
$65 million in legal and investment banking fees and $6.5 million in 
executive compensation to resist a hostile takeover.93 However, when 
one bidder successfully acquired the target and tried to deduct its 
hostile acquisition defense costs, the IRS disallowed its deduction.94 
V.   THE IRS’S AGGRESSIVE POST-INDOPCO POSITIONS PROMOTE BAD 
POLICY 
 The IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO positions discussed in Part 
IV are bad from a policy perspective for at least three reasons. First, 
the Service’s opportunistic and aggressive positions lack substantive 
rationale. Second, they violate the matching principle. Finally, they 
ignore the difference between hostile and friendly acquisitions. 
A.   The IRS’s Positions Lack Rationale 
 The IRS’s aggressive position in PNC Bancorp was bad from a pol-
icy perspective because it lacked substantive rationale. In that case, 
the IRS opportunistically tried to piggyback onto SFAS 91 to require 
banks to capitalize costs that it had previously allowed banks to cur-
rently deduct.95 The court in PNC Bancorp determined that “the rea-
sons for SFAS 91’s requirement that loan origination costs be de-
ferred are reasons wholly specific to the realm of financial account-
ing, and thus those financial accounting standards do not affect our 
tax analysis.”96 
                                                                                                                    
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The Commissioner took this position in A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 119 F.3d 
482 (7th Cir. 1997). See infra Part VI.C. 
 93. Sheppard, supra note 3, at 1458 (discussing Gulf Oil’s attempts to resist the Mesa 
Petroleum and Chevron takeovers). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See supra Part IV.A. 
 96. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 832 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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 The court continued, “[i]n fact, . . . the IRS’s wholesale importa-
tion of the line drawn by the financial accounting standards creates 
tax consequences that the Commissioner appears not to have consid-
ered.”97 Apparently, if banks had to capitalize the loan origination 
costs, they would have to include these costs in each loan’s basis. 
Such inclusions represented a departure from current practice, as the 
bank’s basis in a loan had always been equal to the money the bank 
advanced, irrespective of origination costs.98 Therefore, the court saw 
the IRS’s failure to consider these and other tax ramifications as an 
indication that the IRS lacked independent tax analysis and had 
simply bootstrapped financial accounting standards into the tax 
arena.99 
B.   The IRS’s Positions Violate the Matching Principle 
 The IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO positions also led to signifi-
cant matching principle violations. The primary purpose of distin-
guishing between expenses that a taxpayer must treat as current de-
ductions versus those that he or she must treat as capital expendi-
tures is to “match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to 
which they are properly attributable.”100 This achieves a more accu-
rate net income calculation for tax purposes.101 For example, when a 
taxpayer purchases an asset with a useful life greater than one year, 
such as a building, he or she cannot deduct the entire cost of the 
building in the purchase year because he or she would underestimate 
income in the purchase year and overestimate income in subsequent 
years. The matching principle requires a taxpayer to spread the pur-
chase cost over the life of the asset. Problems with this requirement, 
as previously discussed in Part II, arise when a taxpayer cannot as-
certain the asset’s useful life and must add the cost to the asset’s ba-
sis. The requirement creates trouble when the “taxpayer cannot jus-
tify a useful life for the intangible asset, leaving the taxpayer with a 
capitalized cost but no amortization deduction to match with the in-
come supposedly resulting from the expenditure.”102 
If expenses incurred by a target corporation during a takeover, for 
example legal and investment banking fees which typically run 
into the millions of dollars, are treated as capital expenditures, 
they create an intangible asset. However, the useful life of the as-
set cannot be determined. Thus, no deductions for depreciation or 
                                                                                                                    
 97. Id. at 832 n.16. 
 98. Id. at 833. 
 99. Id. at 834. 
 100. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992). 
 101. Id. 
 102. W. Eugene Seago & D. Larry Crumbley, INDOPCO: A Tiger, a Pussycat, or a 
Creature Somewhere in Between?, 94 J. TAX’N 14, 15 (2001).  
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amortization would be allowed. Consequently, the expenditures, if 
capital in nature, have very little tax value. The only deduction 
given would be at the dissolution of the enterprise. However, that 
possible future deduction is virtually worthless when compared to 
the much larger tax benefit received if the expenses are treated as 
current deductions.103 
 For example, the IRS’s aggressive position in Wells Fargo violated 
the income matching principle because it forced the corporation to 
immediately pay its officers the portion of the salaries attributable to 
the merger ($150,000), but refused to allow a corresponding deduc-
tion for that expense until the enterprise’s dissolution.104 By that 
time, the time value of money would render the deduction worthless. 
Therefore, the IRS’s position currently overstates the taxpayer’s in-
come because the taxpayer cannot deduct the salary cost even though 
it must pay it currently. Furthermore, no portion of the salaries can 
be deducted over future years, unlike a tangible asset where the tax-
payer can spread the cost of the asset over its useful life. Rather, the 
taxpayer may only take the deduction at the enterprise’s dissolution, 
which may occur at some unknown point in time, if at all. 
 The inability to deduct current expenses until the enterprise’s dis-
solution creates a unique problem because it leads to a significant 
matching principle violation. This matching principle violation cre-
ates a greater problem than permitted matching principle violations 
like accelerated depreciation deductions because of the uncertainty 
regarding the time of dissolution. For example, accelerated deprecia-
tion deductions violate the matching principle because they allow 
taxpayers to take bigger depreciation deductions at the beginning of 
the corresponding asset’s useful life rather than forcing taxpayers to 
spread these deductions evenly over the asset’s useful life. Therefore, 
the taxpayer’s income will be understated in the asset’s earlier years 
and overstated in its later years.105 However, this situation differs 
from the situation where a taxpayer pays salaries currently but can-
not deduct them until the enterprise’s dissolution, because the tax-
payer’s income will be overstated in the year it pays the salary, with-
out knowing whether it will be understated in a future year to cor-
rect the initial overstatement. Also, if the enterprise eventually dis-
solves, that dissolution is so remote that the time value of money 
renders that deduction worthless. Although the government loses 
some revenue due to the time value of money in the case of an accel-
erated depreciation deduction, it does not lose all of its revenue. In 
the scenario created by INDOPCO, however, if the taxpayer does not 
                                                                                                                    
 103. Ingalls, supra note 22, at 1170-71. 
 104. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000).  
 105. Accelerated depreciation benefits taxpayers due to the time value of money. 
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dissolve its enterprise, it loses its entire deduction. Furthermore, a 
taxpayer must dissolve its enterprise to determine how much of its 
deduction was lost due to the time value of money. The government, 
on the other hand, loses a quantifiable amount of money. Therefore, 
being unable to deduct current expenses until the enterprise’s disso-
lution is a unique problem because it leads to a significant matching 
principle violation.106 
C.   The IRS’s Positions Ignore the Distinction Between Hostile and 
Friendly Acquisitions 
 The IRS’s aggressive positions also ignore the distinction between 
hostile and friendly acquisitions. Unlike expenses connected to 
friendly acquisitions, hostile acquisition defense costs do not create a 
future benefit.107 They merely maintain a corporation’s status quo.108 
Because hostile acquisition defense costs do not enrich a taxpayer 
and because the income tax is geared toward taxing wealth, a tax-
payer should not have to pay income taxes on hostile acquisition de-
fense costs.109 Finally, courts can detect which costs are associated 
with hostile versus friendly acquisitions. Thus, drawing this distinc-
tion creates no danger. Taking all of these factors into consideration, 
the IRS’s refusal to distinguish between hostile and friendly acquisi-
tions lacks substantive rationale. 
 First, expenses related to defending a business from a hostile 
takeover fit squarely into § 162(a)’s definition of a current deduc-
tion.110 To qualify under § 162(a), an item must be: (1) paid or in-
curred during the taxable year; (2) used for carrying on any trade or 
business; (3) an expense; (4) a necessary expense; and (5) an ordinary 
expense.111 An expense to defend against a hostile acquisition clearly 
represents an expense the taxpayer pays during the taxable year for 
the purpose of carrying on a trade or business.112 Moreover: 
[i]n light of [the duties the board of directors owes shareholders], it 
easily can be argued that expenditures made in defense of a hostile 
                                                                                                                    
 106. One commentator argues that the matching principle is not a tax value but rather 
a financial accounting concept. Deborah A. Geier, The Myth of the Matching Principle as a 
Tax Value, 15 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 17 (1998). Geier’s article, however, espouses the minority 
view. The matching principle is very much regarded as a “systematic tax benefit rule.” See 
Julie A. Roin, Unmasking the “Matching Principle” in Tax Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 813, 814 
(1993).  
 107. Heidi Katheryn Wambach, The Deductability of Business Expenses Incurred in a 
Hostile Takeover: Staley Rides Again, 51 SMU L. REV. 1603, 1626 (1998). 
 108. Id.  
 109. Although one could argue that a future benefit exists in being a company that no-
body can takeover, the IRS has never tried to make this argument. Moreover, this benefit 
seems more psychic than economic. 
 110. Wambach, supra note 107, at 1620. 
 111. Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971). 
 112. Wambach, supra note 107, at 1626-27. 
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acquirer’s bid should not be capitalized but rather deducted in the 
current year because such duties make the board’s defenses “nec-
essary.” In addition, such defenses are “ordinary” in that any and 
every board would act in conformance with these fiduciary man-
dates.113 
 Furthermore, unlike friendly takeover expenses, § 263(a) does not 
apply to hostile acquisition defense costs because these costs do not 
provide a future benefit.114 Rather, they leave the company in the 
same position it found itself in before the attempted takeover.115 Be-
cause hostile acquisition expenses are inherently different from 
friendly acquisition expenses, the IRS should let taxpayers treat hos-
tile acquisition expenses differently by allowing them to currently 
deduct hostile acquisition expenses while requiring them to capital-
ize friendly acquisition expenses. 
 Some commentators argue that allowing taxpayers to currently 
deduct defensive activities costs “amounts to a governmental subsidy 
to parties resisting tender offers.”116 One commentator insists that 
because “allowing a deduction indicates Congress’s willingness to 
permit or often encourage the activity that qualifies for the deduc-
tion,”117 allowing a current deduction for hostile acquisition expenses 
encourages “corporate taxpayers to push the limits of credulity and 
attempt to attribute as many expenses as possible to defensive 
measures devoid of any future benefit.”118 
 Tax laws truly can have unintended effects on taxpayers. For ex-
ample, assigning fair market value basis to property in decedents’ es-
tates119 creates an incentive for people to retain property rather than 
sell it and put it to its best use. This unintended effect, however, be-
comes neutralized by a tax objective, namely that estates pay taxes 
on a property’s fair market value and not on the value of the dece-
dent’s basis in the property.120 Similarly, although allowing a deduc-
tion for hostile acquisition defense costs may inadvertently encour-
age companies to engage in more hostile acquisition defense activi-
ties, another tax objective cancels this effect: the taxation of income 
                                                                                                                    
 113. Id. at 1622. 
 114. Sarah R. Lyke, Note, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: National Starch Decision 
Adds Wrinkles to Capital Expenditure Issue, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1258-59 (1994) (“Like 
a repair, the defense is not an improvement and thus yields no continuing benefit.”). 
 115. Id. at 1258 (“[S]uch costs, like repair costs, are incurred only to maintain the 
status quo.”).  
 116. Roberts, supra note 33, at 513. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; see also Sheppard, supra note 3, at 1460 (“[A]re not the parties just haggling 
about price? Expenses of resisting a hostile takeover could be viewed as part of a larger 
capital transaction.”). 
 119. I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
 120. Id. § 2031(a) (1994). 
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as a proxy to taxing wealth.121 Therefore, not taxing companies that 
have spent a lot of money defending themselves because they have 
little wealth and, consequently, cannot pay more taxes, overrides the 
possible unintended effect of encouraging companies to engage in 
more hostile acquisition defense activities. 
 To address this commentator’s second point, judges are wise 
enough to know when taxpayers are trying to pull the wool over their 
eyes by disguising friendly acquisition costs as hostile acquisition 
costs. For example, in Victory Markets, Inc. v. Commissioner,122 the 
petitioner argued that its acquirer was unfriendly. However, the 
court determined the opposite.123 Victory Markets was a publicly 
traded corporation in the over-the-counter market, where its common 
stock traded from $15.50 to $24.50 per share between May 1985 and 
May 27, 1986.124 When LNC Industries Proprietary, Ltd. (LNC), be-
gan targeting Victory Markets on May 23, 1986, Victory Markets re-
jected LNC’s initial $30 per share offer.125 However, on June 8, 1986, 
it agreed to merge with LNC for $37 per share.126 
 The court addressed whether Victory Markets could currently de-
duct the expenditures incident to LNC’s acquisition.127 Victory Mar-
kets argued that, unlike the acquirer in INDOPCO, LNC acquired 
Victory Markets in a hostile takeover and therefore INDOPCO did 
not apply.128 However, the court found that “[w]hile petitioner had 
painstakingly attempted to characterize the nature of the takeover 
as hostile, the evidence does not support such a characterization or 
finding.”129 The court found the following facts indicated that the 
transaction was friendly: (1) Victory Markets entered into an agree-
ment and plan of merger with LNC only sixteen days after LNC’s ini-
tial contact with it;130 (2) LNC’s initial contact letter stated its desire 
to negotiate a mutually acceptable merger agreement and its hope 
that the “transaction can be completed on a mutually acceptable and 
friendly basis”131; (3) “at no time did LNC attempt to circumvent the 
board of directors by making a tender offer directly to petitioner’s 
                                                                                                                    
 121. See Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax? 89 
YALE L.J. 1081, 1081 (1980) (“Levying the tax on income is . . . simply a logical concomitant 
of the proposition that society in general has a claim on its annual product that is prior to 
the claim of its individual citizens.”). 
 122. 99 T.C. 648 (1992). 
 123. Id. at 661-62. 
 124. Id. at 649. 
 125. Id. at 651, 654. 
 126. Id. at 655. 
 127. Id. at 657. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 661-62. 
 130. Id. at 655. 
 131. Id. at 662. 
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shareholders”132; and (4) the board did not activate its dividend rights 
plan, one of its hostile takeover defenses.133 Therefore, Victory Mar-
kets not only illustrates that courts can distinguish between friendly 
and hostile transactions, but it also outlines many factors that future 
courts can use as guidance to distinguish between different types of 
corporate transactions.  
 Commentators are also concerned by the fact that after the target 
unsuccessfully defends the acquisition, the acquirer becomes the 
party seeking the deductions for the target’s unsuccessful resistance 
costs.134 This fact concerns commentators because the acquirer-
taxpayer simultaneously capitalizes its own acquisition costs and 
currently deducts the former target’s defense costs.135  
 Although this dichotomy seems like a bonus to the acquirer, it 
really is not. When an acquirer buys a corporation, it buys all of its 
assets and liabilities. Therefore, although the acquirer buys a com-
pany with currently deductible defense costs, it also buys a company 
with less assets because a portion of them paid for heavy investment 
banking fees. 
VI.   NOTHING LEFT OF INDOPCO 
 Displeased with the IRS’s aggressive positions, post-INDOPCO 
courts have limited INDOPCO considerably. The Third Circuit pre-
vented the IRS from forcing taxpayers to capitalize previously de-
ductible expenses without a valid tax rationale, despite INDOPCO’s 
“deductions are exceptions to the norm of capitalization” language, 
by placing an extra restriction on the separate and distinct asset 
test.136 The Eighth Circuit prevented the IRS from forcing taxpayers 
to capitalize previously deductible expenses by severely restricting 
INDOPCO’s future benefit test.137 Finally, using the business attack 
defense doctrine, the Seventh Circuit narrowed INDOPCO’s holding 
to apply only to friendly takeover acquisitions.138 
A.   PNC Bancorp Places a Restriction on the Separate and Distinct 
Asset Test 
 Courts have limited INDOPCO by narrowly applying the separate 
and distinct asset test. For example, in PNC Bancorp, the court re-
stricted the separate and distinct asset test by holding that to be 
                                                                                                                    
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Roberts, supra note 33, at 513 n.161. 
 135. Id. 
 136. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 830 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 137. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874, 886 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 138. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 119 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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capitalizable, an expense must create a separate and distinct asset or 
be more than an expense associated with separate and distinct asset 
creation.139 This clever distinction prevented the IRS from forcing 
banks to capitalize expenses it had always deducted.140 
 PNC Bancorp addressed whether a bank could deduct certain 
marketing, researching, and loan originating expenses.141 The Third 
Circuit held these costs currently deductible and initially found that 
they were clearly ordinary and necessary business expenses under § 
162(a).142 The court then addressed whether the banks incurred these 
costs for “betterments to increase the value of property in a way that 
would require these costs’ capitalization under § 263.”143 The court 
applied Lincoln Savings’s separate and distinct asset test and con-
cluded that the taxpayer’s marketing and origination activities were 
currently deductible because they did not actually “create” the banks’ 
loans in the same way that the activities in Lincoln Savings created 
the Secondary Reserve fund.144 Although the expenses in question 
were either associated with the loans, incurred in connection with 
the acquisition of the loans, or “directly related to the creation of the 
loans,” they did not “create” the loans.145 The court contrasted the 
way the payments themselves formed the Secondary Reserve corpus 
in Lincoln Savings with how the expenses in this case did not become 
part of the loan balance.146 
 The Third Circuit in PNC Bancorp restricts the IRS’s aggressive 
position in two ways. First, it places an extra restriction on the sepa-
rate and distinct asset test, which distinguishes between costs that 
create a separate and distinct asset versus costs associated only with 
a separate and distinct asset’s creation. Apparently, the court recog-
nized that the IRS’s opportunistic pursuit of capitalization for previ-
ously deductible expenses lacked substantive rationale.147  
                                                                                                                    
 139. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 830. 
 140. See id. at 834-35. 
 141. Id. at 824. The PNC Bancorp tax court held that taxpayers cannot currently de-
duct these costs because banks incur them to create new loans, which are separate and dis-
tinct bank assets. Therefore, banks must capitalize these costs as though they created a 
separate and distinct asset. PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 349, 375 (1998), rev’d, 
212 F.3d 822 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 142. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 829. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 829-30.  
 145. Id. (quoting PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 349, 366 (1998)). 
 146. Id. at 830.  
 147. Id. at 824-25.  
Historically, the costs at issue have been deductible in the year that they are 
incurred; however, the Commissioner rejected this tax treatment by PNC. Why 
is the Commissioner now insisting upon capitalization of these costs? . . . [T]he 
IRS apparently viewed INDOPCO as a reason to pursue capitalization of the 
costs that SFAS 91 requires to be deferred.  
Id. 
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 Second, the PNC Bancorp court reduced INDOPCO to its facts by 
confining it to mergers.148 The court used language such as “in the 
merger situation presented in INDOPCO,”149 as well as “[i]n the 
INDOPCO context of a friendly takeover, the Court found . . . .”150 
These statements indicate that the court narrowly construed 
INDOPCO. 
B.   Wells Fargo Extends the “Origin of the Claim” Doctrine to Create 
the Direct/Indirect Test 
 The Wells Fargo court also prevented the IRS from forcing tax-
payers to capitalize previously deductible expenses by severely re-
stricting INDOPCO’s future benefit test. One commentator accu-
rately predicted the IRS’s position in Wells Fargo:  
If “the existence of future benefits” is the key criterion for capitali-
zation despite the capital transaction facts of INDOPCO, taxpay-
ers may very well encounter nondeductibility of expenses that 
were heretofore believed to be currently deductible, including the 
following items: . . . Executive salaries and other expenses associ-
ated with strategic planning by middle level and upper level man-
agement in developing plans and techniques for business growth 
and expansion . . . . The rationale? A business’s growth is a long 
term benefit. If the CEO and other senior executives of a corpora-
tion spend half their time in strategic planning and developing 
growth strategies, then perhaps an allocable one-half of their com-
pensation must be capitalized.151 
 Indeed, in Wells Fargo, the IRS tried to deny a deduction of 
$150,000, which represented the portion of the target’s officers’ sala-
ries attributable to their work on the acquisition, even though the 
target did not hire any of them specifically for that task.152 Although 
the Tax Court sided with the IRS,153 the Eighth Circuit held that the 
taxpayer need not capitalize the $150,000.154 The appellate court rea-
                                                                                                                    
 148. See Fenicato, supra, note 70, at 14 (“Since PNC’s costs could not even remotely 
resemble a merger, the Court confined INDOPCO to its facts, reined-in the IRS, and pulled 
the plug on its broad interpretation of INDOPCO.”).  
 149. PNC Bancorp, 212 F.3d at 833. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Elliot, supra note 2, at 31. 
 152. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 153. Norwest Corp. v. Comm’r, 112 T.C. 89, 102 (1999), rev’d sub nom. Wells Fargo & 
Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000). 
In sum, we hold that [the taxpayer] may not deduct any of the disputed costs 
because all costs were sufficiently related to an event that produced a signifi-
cant long-term benefit. Although the costs were not incurred as direct costs of 
facilitating the event that produced the long-term benefit, the costs were essen-
tial to the achievement of that benefit. 
Id. 
 154. Wells Fargo, 224 F.3d at 889. 
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soned that because the salary expenses related only indirectly to the 
merger, they were currently deductible.155 Importantly, this holding 
recognized that to capitalize an expense, the expense not only must 
relate to a transaction that produces a future benefit, but also must 
directly relate to that transaction.  
 The Wells Fargo court arrived at this direct/indirect test by ex-
tending the “origin of the claim doctrine,” which it had originally 
used to distinguish personal expenses from business expenses and 
capital business expenses from ordinary business expenses.156 In do-
ing so, the Wells Fargo court restricted INDOPCO’s future benefit 
test. Applying this new version of the future benefit test, Wells Fargo 
distinguished itself from INDOPCO by finding that the costs in 
INDOPCO directly related to the acquisition, while Wells Fargo’s pe-
titioner’s costs related indirectly to the acquisition because they 
originated from an employment relationship.157 Accordingly, the tax-
payer in INDOPCO had to capitalize its expenses, while the taxpayer 
in Wells Fargo did not. By placing an additional restriction on the fu-
ture benefit test, the Eighth Circuit further limited INDOPCO. 
C.   A.E. Staley Narrows INDOPCO to Friendly Acquisitions 
 Finally, in A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner,158 the 
Seventh Circuit severely restricted INDOPCO’s application by limit-
ing it to friendly acquisitions. A.E. Staley addressed whether a target 
could currently deduct the investment banking fees it incurred while 
defending against a hostile takeover.159 In holding that it could, the 
court reasoned that costs associated with hostile takeover defense 
costs differed from friendly acquisition costs because hostile takeover 
defense costs were considered business attack defense costs.160 The 
“business attack defense” states that businesses can deduct expenses 
that they incur “for the protection of an existing investment, the con-
tinuation of an existing business, or the preservation of existing in-
come from loss or diminution . . . .”161 A.E. Staley marked the first ap-
pellate court case to apply the business attack defense to a hostile 
takeover scenario.162 In A.E. Staley, the court found that taxpayers 
                                                                                                                    
 155. Id. at 888. 
 156. Id. at 886. 
 157. Id. at 887-88. 
 158. 119 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 491-92. 
 161. Id. at 488 n.2 (quoting NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 290 (4th Cir. 
1982)). 
 162. The first court to apply the business attack defense to a hostile takeover scenario 
was a bankruptcy court. In re Federated Dep’t Stores, 171 B.R. 603 (S.D. Ohio 1994). That 
court found that INDOPCO did not undermine the earlier business attack defense deci-
sions. Id. at 608-10. Furthermore, it found that hostile takeover cases are business attack 
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could assert the business attack defense in hostile acquisitions be-
cause INDOPCO neither abrogated nor addressed cases such as 
NCNB Corp. v. United States.163 
 A.E. Staley involved a merger between a target, Staley Continen-
tal, Inc. and Subsidiaries (SCI), and an acquirer, Tate & Lyle.164 
When SCI began to fear the possibility of a hostile takeover, it hired 
a law firm to advise it on anti-takeover measures.165 SCI also hired 
Merrill Lynch as its investment banker to prepare, advise, and assist 
SCI in the event of a hostile takeover.166 Because Merrill Lynch sug-
gested “that SCI identify friendly ‘white knight’ investors to acquire 
enough stock in SCI to block any future takeover attempt, SCI 
sought out Tate & Lyle and discussed the possibility of Tate & Lyle’s 
acquiring a 20 percent interest in SCI.”167 But when Tate & Lyle ac-
quired four percent of the company, SCI began to fear that Tate & 
Lyle would try to acquire the entire company.168 
 Tate & Lyle confirmed SCI’s anxiety and turned from a white 
knight into a dark prince, making a $32 per share tender offer di-
rectly to SCI’s stockholders.169 Moreover, it sued SCI to enjoin its use 
of anti-takeover devices.170 But because SCI’s board recognized it had 
a duty to evaluate the tender offer’s merits, it hired the investment 
                                                                                                                    
defense cases because they involve taxpayers who incur expenses to protect corporate pol-
icy and structure but not to acquire a new asset. Id. 
 163. 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982). An issue in NCNB concerned whether North Caro-
lina National Bank’s parent corporation, NCNB Corporation, could currently deduct the 
expenses incurred in developing and operating a statewide network of branch banking fa-
cilities. Id. at 290. In holding that it could, the court reasoned that such expenses were 
necessary to maintain NCNB’s position in the banking industry. Id. In other words, these 
expenses were currently deductible as business defense expenses. The court also discussed 
a case, Comm’r v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a taxpayer could currently deduct the legal fees he incurred in litigating against an 
order by the Postmaster General depriving his mail order business from use of the mails. 
Id. at 474. The Court reasoned that because the Postmaster General’s legal action threat-
ened to destroy the taxpayer’s business, the taxpayer could deduct the costs as ordinary 
and necessary business expenses. Id. at 471. The A.E. Staley court also discussed a case, 
Locke Mfg. Cos. v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 80 (D. Conn. 1964), where the court held 
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stockholder’s challenge, “including legal fees, proxy solicitor’s fees and public relations 
fees.” A.E. Staley, 119 F.3d at 488. The A.E. Staley court quoted a portion of Locke that dis-
cussed how “it was ordinary for a company to spend money ‘to defend the policies of its di-
rectors from attack by those who would oppose them.’” Id. at 488 (quoting Locke, 237 F. 
Supp. at 86-87). 
 164. A.E. Staley, 119 F.3d at 484. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. Evidence that Tate & Lyle would try to acquire the entire company included 
the fact that it would not sign a “standstill agreement” which would have limited the 
amount of SCI stock it could purchase. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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bankers for advice and assistance.171 SCI’s board then unanimously 
voted to reject the $32 per share offer and a subsequent $35 per 
share offer.172 But when Tate & Lyle increased its tender offer to 
$36.50 per share, the board voted to accept the offer because the in-
vestment bankers said it was fair and because no alternative acquir-
ers surfaced.173  
 By the time the parties consummated the transaction, SCI had 
paid the investment bankers $12.5 million for services in connection 
with SCI’s tender offers.174 SCI attempted to deduct these costs as 
business expenses, but the Commissioner disallowed the deduction.175 
Because the Supreme Court failed to limit its INDOPCO holding to 
friendly acquisitions, the IRS attempted to make the taxpayer capi-
talize its hostile acquisition defense costs.176 Moreover, the IRS tried 
to enforce a “per se transformation rule,” which states that any 
transaction where a corporate taxpayer is transformed from a pub-
licly held corporation to a single shareholder corporation involves a 
future benefit and, therefore, any expenses the taxpayer incurs with 
respect to such a transformation are capital expenditures.177  
 The tax court sided with the IRS, although it tried to avoid adopt-
ing the per se transformation rule.178 The court found that the tax-
payer had to capitalize the hostile acquisition defense costs for the 
following reasons: the new owner saw synergy opportunities; the 
board eventually approved the transaction; and the same share-
holder-related benefits that the Supreme Court looked at in 
INDOPCO, including the reduction in shareholder-related benefits, 
existed in this case.179  
 However, as Judge Cohen’s dissent stated, the only future benefits 
discussed in the majority opinion were those the acquirer per-
ceived.180 Moreover, the majority’s statement about reduction of 
shareholder-related expenses made it seem as if it is always better 
for a corporation to be privately held rather than publicly held.181 
But, as Judge Laro noted in his dissent, “[a] private company does 
not have access to the public markets for new capital and does not 
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have the same liquidity for its shareholders.”182 Thus, Judge Laro 
suggested that one cannot conclude that a company achieves a bene-
fit in itself just by going private.183 
 Convinced by the Tax Court’s dissents, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the Tax Court.184 It found that SCI’s hostile acquisition costs 
were costs associated with defending a business rather than costs as-
sociated with facilitating a capital transaction.185 It reasoned that 
“SCI was defending against an unwanted acquisition in an effort to 
maintain and protect an established business.”186 Therefore, SCI’s 
hostile acquisition defense costs were currently deductible.187 
 Remarkably, this holding declined to follow INDOPCO, even 
though the INDOPCO opinion did not indicate that the “friendly” as-
pect of the transaction was dispositive or that the outcome would dif-
fer if the takeover were considered “hostile.”188 Evidently, the court 
disagreed with the IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO positions and re-
stricted the IRS by carving a big chunk out of INDOPCO. After the 
A.E. Staley decision, trial courts in the Seventh Circuit may only ap-
ply INDOPCO to friendly acquisitions.  
 Additionally, A.E. Staley provided target corporations with the § 
165 safety net. Section 165 provides that “[t]here shall be allowed as 
a deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year and not com-
pensated for by insurance or otherwise.”189 Particularly, § 165 per-
mits taxpayers to deduct costs associated with abandoned capital 
transactions.190 Therefore, the court found that SCI could have de-
ducted the investment banking fees and other costs it incurred while 
resisting Tate & Lyle’s takeover under this section also.191 The court 
seemed to tell taxpayers that if other circuits fail to respect the hos-
tile versus friendly acquisition distinction, § 165 gives them another 
shield to protect themselves from the IRS’s aggressive positions.192  
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VII.   NOTHING LEFT OF INDOPCO: LET’S KEEP IT THAT WAY! 
 Although post-INDOPCO courts have severely restricted 
INDOPCO, it is still “the supreme law of the land.”193 Furthermore, 
nine of twelve circuits still have not commented on the case. The cir-
cuits that have spoken on INDOPCO have each overturned tax court 
decisions that sided with the IRS.194 Therefore, Congress should di-
rect the Treasury to enact regulations that codify the Third, Seventh 
and Eighth Circuit holdings to unify the law in all circuits. If the 
Treasury does not enact such regulations, the IRS will continue to 
pursue its aggressive positions and use the ammunition provided by 
INDOPCO against taxpayers.195 First, INDOPCO contains the follow-
ing powerful and pro-IRS language: “deductions are exceptions to the 
norm of capitalization.” Second, INDOPCO favors the IRS by lifting 
the “separate and distinct asset barrier” that five circuits have used 
to confine the IRS. After INDOPCO, the IRS could deny current de-
ductions in cases where the expense created some type of future 
benefit for the taxpayer, even though it did not create a separate and 
distinct asset. Finally, because the Supreme Court in INDOPCO did 
not limit its holding to friendly acquisitions, the IRS could freely 
deny current deductions for expenses related to both friendly and 
hostile acquisitions. Despite A.E. Staley’s holding, which limited 
INDOPCO to friendly acquisitions, “[t]he IRS has vowed to pursue 
capitalization in Staley-type issues in the future.”196 
 Another justification for codification of the Third, Seventh and 
Eighth Circuit holdings relates to the poor policy that the IRS’s ag-
gressive post-INDOPCO positions promote. First, the Service’s ag-
gressive, opportunistic positions lack substantive rationale. Second, 
the Service’s aggressive positions violate the matching principle. Fi-
nally, the Service’s aggressive positions ignore the difference between 
hostile and friendly acquisitions. Therefore, the Treasury should 
promote a sound policy by enacting such regulations.  
 The Treasury should enact the suggested regulations by including 
them as “Types of Non-Capital Expenditures” under § 263(a)’s treas-
ury regulations. The first type of noncapital expenditures the Treas-
ury should include are expenses regularly incurred in the creation of 
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separate and distinct assets.197 Examples of these types of noncapital 
expenditures include the marketing, researching, and loan originat-
ing expenses at issue in PNC Bancorp.198 The Treasury should also 
include expenses incurred in connection with, but not directly related 
to, a capital acquisition. An example of this type of noncapital expen-
diture is the portion of the target officers’ salaries attributable to 
their work on a friendly acquisition, such as the one involved in Wells 
Fargo.199 Finally, the Treasury should include expenses incurred to 
defend a business against a hostile acquisition. An example of this 
type of noncapital expenditure is the investment banking fees the 
target paid Merrill Lynch in A.E. Staley.200 
 Alternatively, the treasury regulations could enumerate the type 
of capital acquisition costs that are capitalizable and limit those costs 
to investment banking and legal fees associated with friendly acqui-
sitions. The Treasury should also list factors to help courts distin-
guish between friendly and hostile acquisitions. For this purpose, the 
Treasury should borrow Victory Markets’ factors.201 Such factors in-
clude: (1) the number of days elapsed from initial contact to the par-
ties’ final agreement; (2) whether the acquirer went directly to the 
shareholders, thereby circumventing the board of directors; and (3) 
whether the target had anti-takeover devices, such as poison pills, 
but failed to use them.202 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
 Although INDOPCO’s reach initially frightened taxpayers, in the 
last decade courts have stepped in to ease some of these fears. Rec-
ognizing that the IRS’s aggressive post-INDOPCO behavior promotes 
bad policy, courts have used a range of judicial doctrines to contain 
this behavior. However, because INDOPCO represents current law 
and many circuits have yet to touch upon the numerous issues it 
raises, taxpayers need more protection from INDOPCO. Therefore, 
Congress should direct the Treasury to enact regulations that codify 
the Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuit holdings to prevent the IRS 
from asserting its aggressive post-INDOPCO positions in other cir-
cuits. 
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